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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal, pursuant to U.C. A. §78A-4-103(2)(j)(2008), 
as an interlocutory appeal granted from a denial of summary judgment by the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, entered on January 26, 2009. This appeal was "poured-
over" to the Utah Court of Appeals from the Utah Supreme Court. 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Whether the trial court properly decided that there was a material issue of fact whether 
Waters was a "keeper" of a dog, within the meaning of U.C.A. §18-1-1(1971)? 
2. Whether the trial court properly declined to judicially create a category of persons who 
cannot recover from the "owner" of a dog? 
The standard of review for all issues is de novo, as the case was decided on summary 
judgment. See Neztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1993)(summary judgment question of 
"keeper" reviewed de novo). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a dog bite on March 4, 2005. Waters was an employee of City Pet 
Club, a day care for dogs. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below 
1 
Waters tik-j this action ..j»u!i .i r - , . , ..• " M , I hud District 
•-I • r -cined a motion for summary judgment by Powell, and this Court gi anted a 
petition for interlocutory appeal on March 11, 2009. 
3. 
On or about March 4 ^On^  \\ aters was employed as the Kennel Manager at City Pet Club, 
a day care and boarding kennel located m U\L \I.I . ,K'. : • • .«»* vi it was 
W ''-'>' responsibil.it}' to handle the staff and incoming clientele, as well as ensure the safety and 
cleanliness ofall the dogs in the facility. R. 35, Fact 2. It was also uaiers' responsibility lo kvd Ihe 
dogs, take them lo Ihe kitliiooiii, and exercise flinn in pln\ areas. R. 35, Fact 3. On the day of the 
bite, Powell brought his dog "Snoop" to City Pet Club to be barded there for a number of days. R. 
36, Fact 4. While Waters was introducing "Mioop *• -i . ;• - "--a N .-. •: w : 
aiu: *• • ' \ . 36, Fact 5. Waters intervened and grabbed hold of Snoop by her 
"scruff', the hair on the back of a dog's neck. R. 36, Fact 6, Waters then attempted to remove Snoop 
from »;ie pia\ aiea : • :. : salet\ concerns for all the dogs. Snoop 
lunged a second time toward a dog. Waters pulled back on Snoop's scruff, at which point Snoop 
turned and bit Waters on the leg. R. MK hici /' Winers icsiilied ihai Snoop had a hisior- • eing 
o\ere\-:-is--.* .»r a^nvssn e ir: the open play area with other dogs. On previous visits, Snoop had been 
aggressive toward other does K 46, fact 9. Prior to Marui -4. _ <H;. . \\ aieiN :uu. •, -. .. t 
Snoop had been aggress\ • • ;- : 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the trial court's decision because the undisputed evidence is subject 
to differing interpretations by the jury, the finder of fact, as to whether Waters was a "keeper" under 
the dog bite statute. The Utah dog bite statute does not extend to those who merely "harbor" a dog, 
or who "are in possession of a dog", as the statutes of other states. Instead, the class of persons liable 
under the Utah statute are only "owners" or "keepers". A jury could find that Waters was neither. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
IT IS A JURY QUESTION WHETHER WATERS WAS A "KEEPER" 
WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE DOG BITE STATUTE 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the question of who is a "keeper" under the dog bite 
statute of U.C.A. §18-1-1 inNeztsosie v. Meyer, 883 P.2d 920 (Utah 1993). InNeztsosie, the owner 
of the dog left the dog in the care of his father when he left town. The father was left with food and 
water for the dog. When the dog got loose, it bit a young boy. The Neztsosie court stated: 
It is difficult to frame a universal definition of keeper, but the assumption of custody, 
management, and control is intrinsic to the definition. The term implies 'the exercise 
of a substantial number of the incidents of ownership by one who, though not the 
owner, assumes to act in his stead . . . One becomes the keeper of a dog only when 
he, either with or without the owner's permission, undertakes to manage, control, or 
care for it as dog owners in general are accustomed to do.' [citations omitted]. 
Neztsosie, at 921-922. 
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The Neztsosie court held, as a matter of law, that a mere agreement to care for a dog, by 
feeding it and checking on its welfare, is not acting as a "keeper" within the meaning of the dog bite 
statute. The Neztsosie court recognized that mere custody of a dog, even combined with an 
assumption of the feeding and watering of the dog, did not create a "keeper". 
She did not agree to anything with Powell; Powell had an agreement with Waters' employer, 
City Pet Club. There is no evidence of the terms of that agreement, but it is clear that Waters had no 
agreement with Powell. When she was bitten, Waters was actually acting in the capacity of a third 
party defending the dog that "Snoop" was attacking, not as "Snoop"'s owner. 
If the agreement between Powell and City Pet Club are imputed to Waters, it is still a jury 
question. Waters' situation is much like that of Neztsosie. The facts before the court show that City 
Pet Club had agreed to feed and board "Snoop", but there is no evidence that it assumed any further 
"incidents of ownership" of the dog. The Neztsosie court requires not just an agreement to feed and 
water a dog, and to check on its welfare, in order to turn a temporary custodian of a dog into a 
"keeper". It is a jury question whether City Pet Club assumed the "substantial number of incidents 
of ownership" that Neztsosie requires by its agreement to let "Snoop" sleep over at its kennel. 
There are a handful of other jurisdictions that have judicially created categories of "keepers". 
The court in Salisbury v. FeriolU 49 Mass.App.Ct. 485, 730 N.E.2d 373 (2000) ruled as a matter of 
law that a veterinarian's assistant was a "keeper". The veterinarian presents a stronger case for 
adoption of a "keeper" rule. The fact of rendering medical care to an injured or sick dog arguably 
involves the "substantial incidents of dog ownership" required by Neztsosie. By contrast, Waters 
4 
rendered no professional assistance to Snoop; she was there only to feed and water him, and keep 
a general eye on him. This is far less of an involvement than the intimate physical contact required 
to give veterinary care. In Tschida v. Berdusco, 462 N.W.2d 410 (Minn. App. 1990), the court 
likewise held that a veterinarian assistant fell within the definition of "owner" under Minnesota law. 
For the reasons suggested regarding the Salisbury case, supra, the Tschida rationale should be limited 
to the veterinary situation. Further, the Minnesota statute defines "owner" to include those 
"harboring" or "keeping" a dog. Outside the veterinary situation, however, the Minnesota Supreme 
Court stated: "keeping a dog, as used in the statute before us, implies more than the mere harboring 
of the dog for a limited purpose or time. One becomes the keeper of a dog only when he either with 
or without the owner's permission undertakes to manage, control or care for it as dog owners in 
general are accustomed to do." Verrett v. Silver, 244 N.W.2d 147,149; 309 Minn. 275 (1976). This 
passage was quoted with approval by the Neztsosie court. Applying the Verrett definition, it is clear 
that Waters was not doing anything more than "the mere harboring of the dog for a limited purpose 
or time". This suggests that the term "harboring", found in the Minnesota statute, is broader than 
"keeping". And so we see in the Verrett case a definition of "harboring" that is broader than 
"keeping": "Harboring or keeping a dog means something more than a meal of mercy to a stray dog 
or the casual presence of a dog on someone's premises. Harboring means to afford lodging, to shelter 
or to give refuge to a dog." Concededly, there would be a jury question whether Waters would fall 
within this definition of "harboring", when she undertook to "afford lodging, to shelter or to give 
refuge to [Snoop]".It would seem unlikely that a jury would find that Waters was "keeping" Snoop 
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according to the Verrett deliniin>ii> ci lcj in .\czisosic. I lit1 ln-il m m i i/nniTiK tefusol lo kiki1 ilie 
ii1-'" «I.M - \\a^. a "keener" of Snoop from the jury. 
Accordingly the Wisconsin Supreme Court uphelu ....n voi.n * rck^a; i^ .^
 :.I • •-
employee's case i- ,: |a; :.. -.• ! i •••>••!«• n-* fa j..w liable, and defined "owner" 
as follows: "'owner1 includes an\ person vh»< owns, narhois ^ keeps a dog." Armstrong y 
Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co 1l- ^ . - .v, • i>_. ;^ 
• i .- ^ \ i \! ' >N : ( ! 993k a statute which imposed strict liability on a person who 
was an "owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog". 
The case ui ww/."//. • •• > % • 'i- - •• "), cited by Powell, construed a 
statute which defined "keeper" as follows: "'Keeper' means any person, other than the owner, 
harboring or having in his possession any dog " ' his slatuloiy delmilion «^""kcepe*"** is so In nm! 
as (on k hide am - »i ir "h\\\ iiii» in his possession any dog". ' Fhis case provides little use to a "I Jtah court. 
POINT I WO 
FHIS € O I JR I SI I.CM II I) NO I J l IDICIAI 1 , \. REW RI I E THE DOGBI IE 
STATUTE TO SUIT POWELL 
Powell urges this Court to judicially rewrite the I Jtah dog bite statute to incluuv. ai > • » • i •) 
""harbors a dog, ui anvuiie '*"h;t\ nig in Ins possession anv doi'"' in the manner of other states. But the 
courts do nut rewrite statutes, to help om the Legislature. See Mountain States Tel. & Tel.Co. v. 
Public Service Comm . 107TThui ;>dJ. . i ' .^i . roml innsl inln pnli shinies 
" kec p m L- * : k \s ok statutory construction, viz., that the interpretation must 
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be based on the language used, and that the court has no power to rewrite a statute to make it 
conform to an intention not expressed." The dog bite statute must be taken as it is written, not as 
Powell would have this Court rewrite it. If the term "keeper" is to include anyone in temporary 
possession of the dog, the statute can easily be so amended. Until then, "keeper" means something 
more than just "temporary custody or possession". 
This Court should consider carefully whether an expansive reading of "keeper" is prudent. 
Enlarging the definition of "keepers" to include any temporary custodian of a dog creates an 
expansive class of persons potentially liable under the dog bite statute. Does paying the neighbor boy 
to walk your dog make him a "keeper"? Does leaving your dog with your neighbor while you take 
a short vacation make your neighbor an involuntary "keeper" liable for the dog's bite? The best 
course is to let juries decide each case on its facts, rather than judicially create categories of 
"keepers" that are or are not liable or able to recover. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted the Verrett definition of "keeper" and "harborer" in 
Neztsosie. Following the Neztsosie case, the trial court properly denied summary judgment because 
a jury could find that Waters did not exercise the substantial incidents of ownership necessary to 
make her a "keeper", as opposed to merely "harboring [Snoop] for a limited purpose or time". A jury 
verdict either way would be supported by the evidence, as the trial court correctly held. The trial 
court should be AFFIRMED. 
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